by Anton Gollwitzer, Irmak Olcaysoy Okten, Angel Osorio Pizarro, & Gabriele Oettingen
In nine studies spanning 3,277 participants, we find that fanaticism and its associated antisocial behaviors thrive when people lack intellectual humility—they feel absolutely certain of a belief while perceiving that most others oppose it, a state dubbed “discordant knowing.” Inducing this low-humility mindset made participants more aggressive, more likely to dismiss contrary evidence, and more eager to join extremist groups on issues ranging from the 2020 U.S. election and abortion to vaccines and religion. These results highlight that the real driver of radical behavior is the mix of rock-solid certainty and perceived opposition rather than the belief’s content, and pointing to intellectual humility as a key lever for prevention.
by Gabriele Oettingen, Anton Gollwitzer, Jiin Jung, & Irmak Olcaysoy Okten
This theoretical paper argues that antisocial behaviour rooted in conspiracy beliefs hinges on a two-part condition: (1) the believer feels absolutely sure the conspiracy is true, and (2) they perceive that most other people reject it. We call this blend “misplaced certainty.” Misplaced certainty is linked to aggression, wilful ignorance and attraction to extremist groups. Focusing on this concept clarifies when and why conspiracy beliefs turn into harmful actions.
by Anton Gollwitzer & Gabriele Oettingen
People sometimes dodge uncertainty by asserting they know something they simultaneously admit is unknowable—a move we call paradoxical knowing, rooted in low intellectual humility. Study-Set 1 showed this shortcut is common across topics and emotions: people confidently “knew” future fortunes, moral truths, even love, despite conceding these outcomes can’t be known for sure. Study-Set 2 uncovered a driver: when important goals carried high stakes, participants’ intellectual humility dropped and paradoxical knowing spiked—they felt certain they would achieve those goals while still admitting the future is inherently uncertain. Study-Set 3 revealed the cost: greater paradoxical knowing predicted more aggression, deliberate ignorance, and willingness to join extremist groups. Together, the studies demonstrate that lacking intellectual humility fosters paradoxical knowing, which in turn fuels antisocial and fanatical behaviour.
by Young-Ju Ryu, Irmak Olcaysoy Okten, & Gabriele Oettingen
Across two studies, intellectually humble participants who experienced an intellectual setback were more likely to compare themselves with others in order to learn (self-improvement), and doing so helped them feel better afterward. Intellectual humility was either unrelated (Study 1) or negatively related (Study 2) to comparisons aimed at protecting ego (self-enhancement).
by Anton Gollwitzer, Evelina Bao, & Gabriele Oettingen
Across two studies with 884 participants, we tested whether intellectual humility—recognizing that you might be wrong—helps people abandon false beliefs. We looked at two hot-button examples: vaccine safety and claims that the 2020 U.S. election was rigged. People who scored higher in intellectual humility spent more time reading information that challenged their views, and that extra exposure often nudged them toward more accurate positions. However, humility by itself did not strongly or consistently flip minds, suggesting it is only a modest tool in fighting misinformation and should be combined with other approaches.
by Jiin Jung, Irmak Olcaysoy Okten, Anton Gollwitzer, & Gabriele Oettingen
A network analysis revealed that intellectual humility—the readiness to admit you could be wrong and revise your views—grows when two attitudes are present: objectivism, a commitment to evidence-based thinking, and gratitude, which lowers defensiveness. It shrinks under two pressures: dogmatism, the rigid conviction that one’s beliefs are infallible, and low self-esteem, which makes acknowledging uncertainty feel personally threatening.
by Young‐Ju Ryu, Irmak Olcaysoy Okten, Anton Gollwitzer, & Gabriele Oettingen
In two studies, we found that people who score high on intellectual humility—the willingness to admit their knowledge might be wrong—were more diligent about COVID-19 precautions such as social distancing, hand-washing, and mask-wearing. In Study 1, this link arose because intellectually humble participants trusted data-driven sources (doctors, scientists) and felt personally responsible for stopping the virus. Study 2 confirmed this pattern across time (two weeks later), revealing that intellectually humble participants' edge came not from actively hunting for expert advice but from readily accepting solid evidence whenever they encountered it. These results highlight intellectual humility as a useful trait for making smart choices during periods of societal uncertainty.
May 7 symposium
Heather Battaly (UConnecticut): Countering servility through pride and humility
Alessandra Tanesini (Cardiff): Intellectual humility and the vices that oppose it
Marco Meyer (Hamburg) & Boudewijn de Bruin (Groningen): Epistemic vice and its effects
Katharina Helming (Warwick): A developmental approach to intellectual humility
May 8 symposium
Anton Gollwitzer (Yale): IH predicts reductions in conspiratorial thinking by encouraging information search
Aleksandra Cichocka (Kent): Narcissism and political beliefs - the perils and pitfalls of arrogance
Rick Hoyle (Duke): Intellectual humility in the face of truth, certainty, or conviction
Philip Pärnamets (Karolinska): Intellectual humility and attitudes during the COVID-19 pandemic
May 14 symposium
Stephan Lewandowsky (Bristol): Star networks and intellectual humility
Cailin O’Connor (UC-Irvine): Social Biases in network models
Jay Van Bavel (NYU): Affective and epistemic networks
May 15 symposium
Hal Roberts (Harvard): Network propaganda
Maria Baghramian (University College Dublin): Scepticism, intellectual humility and the value of distrust
Shauna Bowes (Emory University): Stepping outside the echo chamber: Is intellectual humility associated with less political myside bias?
Mark Alfano (Macquarie): The many-scales condensation of intellectual humility research and its expansion to the context of intergroup conflict